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Notes: Iran-contra Affair Investigation, Testimony By
Secretary Of State George Shultz, July 23-24
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department:  General
Published:  Wednesday, July 29, 1987
July 23: In his testimony before the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair,
Secretary of State George Shultz laid out a chronicle of duplicity and intrigue at the highest levels
of government, saying that he was deceived repeatedly by Reagan's top officials and that they
withheld vital information from him and from the president to keep the Iran arms sales alive. Shultz
said that when he told Reagan about a plan late last year to prevail on Kuwait to free imprisoned
terrorists as a means of gaining the release of US hostages, "the president was stunned and he was
furious." Reagan "was not being given the right information," Shultz charged. A group of other
senior officials, including former CIA director William Casey and ex-national security adviser Adm.
John Poindexter, "had a conflict of interest with the president," Shultz said, and were trying to use
Reagan to "bail them out." Shultz disputed assertions that he had intentionally kept himself in the
dark about the administration's policies in Iran and Nicaragua. He maintained that government
intelligence reports were often skewed in favor of administration policy. He asserted that the
president had been ill served by Poindexter and North and that for many months he had been
locked in what he called a "battle royal" with Casey, Poindexter and others for the president's ear.
After the president's broadcast press conference last November, in which Reagan made a number
of erroneous statements, Shultz had "a long, tough discussion, not the kind of discussion I ever
thought I'd have with the president of the US." Asked whether the country had benefited from the
efforts of Poindexter and fired National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North to "keep the
contras alive," Shultz responded, "I don't think desirable ends justify means of lying, deceiving, of
doing things that are outside our Constitutional processes." Moreover, he continued, "Out of this
big diversion of funds, [the contras] got practically nothing out of it." Although he did not tie it to
the conflict over the Iran deal, Shultz acknowledged that he had tried to resign in August 1986 and
on two earlier occasions. He said he had "felt a sense of estrangement" from the administration and
knew "the White House was very uncomfortable with me...There was a kind of guerrilla warfare
going on." Shultz said he had first tried to resign in 1983 after discovering that former national
security adviser Robert McFarlane had made a secret trip to the Middle East. This early foreign
policy initiative by the National Security Council without the State Department's knowledge "may
have had something to do" with how the administration later became ensnared in the Iran-contra
scandal, he suggested. The thrust of Shultz's testimony seemed intended to refute the one major
criticism of his performance during the Iran operation that he did not do enough to stop it. While
he conceded that he had received hints as early as November 1985 about dealings with Iran, Shultz
repeatedly said he had conveyed his objections to the president and thought the "whole project had
been told to stand down." Shultz differed in several key ways with earlier witnesses. Poindexter, for
example, testified that Shultz did not want to know about the Iran arms sales. But Shultz derided
this as "ridiculous." "What I said to Admiral Poindexter was that I wanted to be informed of the
things I needed to know to do my job as Secretary of State but he didn't need to keep me posted
on details, the operational details, of what he was doing," Shultz said. He added that after an
argument within the administration over making government employees take lie detector tests,
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which he objected to, he wanted to avoid being put in a position where anyone could suspect him of
leaking details about confidential information. Shultz's account also differed with North's testimony
that Shultz was well aware of the colonel's activities in support of the contras after Congress had
approved the Boland amendment. Shultz said he had no idea about North's contra activities. Many
committee members appeared persuaded by Shultz. Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH) said, "I think
we could fairly observe" that on one of Poindexter's main differences with Shultz, the Secretary
"is probably correct." That conflict was over Poindexter's testimony that he had briefed Reagan
about a highly controversial nine-point plan negotiated by Albert Hakim that would have led the
Iranians to believe the US favored the release of Shiite terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait. Shultz said
the president was "astonished" when he told him about the plan in December. The plan would
have gone directly against US policy not to negotiate with terrorists. Other major points in Shultz's
testimony follow: * He was not informed about the finding Reagan signed on January 16, 1986,
authorizing the secret sale of weapons to Iran, until last November. He did not learn about an earlier
finding, signed in December 1985 and destroyed by Poindexter, until it was revealed during the
hearings. * Former national security adviser Robert McFarlane, Poindexter and Casey repeatedly
misled him or tried to keep him misinformed about the Iran deal. He was not told about McFarlane's
secret trip to Teheran in May 1986 until after it was over. And then he was told that it had "fizzled"
and that the operation had stopped. He said that during the Tokyo economic summit meeting,
also in May 1986, Poindexter falsely told him there was no real truth to a report that the admiral
was involved in selling arms to Iran. * Casey went behind his back to get the president to reverse
a decision in December 1986 after the scandal had become public, and resume the negotiations
with Iran. Shultz said one of his deputies had worked out an agreement with Casey to have one last
meeting in Frankfurt with the Iranian intermediaries to tell them the operation was over. But he
said Casey had then persuaded Reagan to allow further discussion at the meeting. The agenda of
the meeting included a discussion of the disputed nine-point plan. Casey used a "deceptive way
of letting us find out that it had been changed," Shultz said. According to Shultz, Casey had called
the State Department to say he had heard that there had been a change in White House thinking
without mentioning his own role. His fight with Casey had a larger significance, Shultz testified.
"It meant that the battle to get intelligence separated from policy, and control over the policy, was
very much in play. And the director of Central Intelligence wanted to keep himself heavily involved
in this policy, which he had been involved in, apparently all along." "I hate to say it but I believe
that one of the reasons the president was given what I regard as wrong information about Iran
and terrorism was that the agency, or the people in the CIA were too involved in this...Long before
this all emerged, I had come to have grave doubts about the objectivity and reliability of some
of the intelligence I was getting," Shultz said. * Shultz described repeated instances in which he
had been misled by McFarlane and Poindexter. In May 1984, he recounted, the US Ambassador to
Israel, Samuel Lewis, had reported to Shultz that Howard Teicher, an NSC staff member, was in
Israel asking the government for a donation for the contras. Shultz said he confronted McFarlane
about it, objecting to the solicitation. Without the State Department's knowledge, the Secretary
complained, it was improper. But he said McFarlane responded that Teicher "was not operating
on instructions, he was there on his own hook." However, McFarlane wrote a memo to Teicher
on April 20, 1984, instructing him how to proceed with the solicitation, making it clear that it was
authorized by the NSC. * Shultz insisted throughout his appearance that he had opposed the Iran
arms sales whenever the policy had come up in from of Reagan, beginning with a meeting on
August 6, 1985. "I said I thought this was a very bad idea, that I was opposed to it, that we're just
falling into the arms-for-hostages business and we shouldn't do it." It was shortly after this that
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Reagan approved the first sale to Iran through Israel. Then in November, while he was attending
the Geneva summit with the Soviet Union, McFarlane called him to report that a shipment of 100
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles was being made to Iran in return for the hostages. Shultz testified that he
again said he was "against it" and was "upset" to be told so late. A few days later he was informed
that the deal had fallen through and the trading was over. But in December 1985 and January 1986,
he said he was called to a series of meetings with the president where the subject of the Iran deal
kept coming up. Shultz said that only he and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger were opposed.
As for Reagan, "It was very clear to me that he wanted to push in that direction," said Shultz. * At
the last meeting, on January 16, 1986, the presidential finding was signed, but Shultz said he had
left before the subject came up and was not told about it. He said it was not until the following
November, after the affair had become public and Reagan had given a partially incorrect account
of the Iran arms sales at a broadcast news conference, that Shultz got his attention again. "You're
telling me things that I don't know, that are news to me," Shultz said the president told him. July
24: Secretary of State George Shultz told the select congressional committees investigating the Iran-
contra affair that the US has "gotten over" the damage caused by the National Security Council
staff's unauthorized deviation from established policy. "I think we have gotten over this well. It
was quite a setback for awhile. King Hussein [of Jordan] in particular was disappointed." Shultz
paraphrased Hussein as saying: "Iran is your enemy and you sold them arms. I am your friend
and you will not sell your arms to me." The Secretary declared that sound US policies must be
supported despite the Iran-contra affair. He said support for the Nicaraguan contras is "essential."
Shultz disposed of suggestions by members of the committees that Reagan may have deceived him.
"He didn't inform me," he said of the presidential findings regarding Iran, "but neither did any of
the other people involved." White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said President Reagan
believes that Secretary Shultz's congressional testimony has been "honest, sincere and helpful."
But Shultz's testimony also rekindled a longstanding battle within the administration between
more conservative officials and those generally described as pragmatists. "The reaction tends to
break out along familiar lines," said a White House aide. "The more conservative folks tend to find
his testimony to be self-serving and barely tolerable. The more pragmatic folks think it might be
helpful in some ways." To conservatives, Shultz has always been part of the pragmatic faction, a
diplomat who did not have the "stomach," as one put it, to pursue the sort of hard-edged, anti-
communist activism that has been called "the Reagan doctrine." That is a main reason they say, he
was cut out of operation that led to the diversion of profits from the Iran arms deal to the contras.
"There is a joke in conservative circles that what we need at the State Department is an American
Desk," said one administration official. To the pragmatists, Shultz has been admired for his devotion
to conventional diplomacy, and they cheered his denunciation of efforts to subvert existing laws
and procedures in the name of freeing hostages in Lebanon, or aiding the contras. (Basic data from
several reports by NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST)
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